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Organ shortage for transplantation remains a worldwide
serious problem for kidney patients with end-stage renal
failure, and several countries have tried different models to
address this issue. Iran has 20 years of experience with one
such model that involves the active role of the government
and charity foundations. Patients with a desperate demand
for a kidney have given rise to a black market of brokers
and other forms of organ commercialism only accessible to
those with sufficient financial resources. The current Iranian
model has enabled most of the Iranian kidney transplant
candidates, irrespective of socioeconomic class, to have
access to kidney transplantation. The Iranian government
has committed a large budget through funding hospital and
staff at the Ministry of Health and Medical Education by
supporting the brain death donation (BDD) program or
redirecting part of the budget of living unrelated renal
donation (LURD) to the BDD program. It has been shown that
it did not prevent the development and progression of a BDD
program. However, the LURD program is characterized by
several controversial procedures (e.g., confrontation of donor
and recipient at the end of the evaluation procedure along
with some financial interactions) that should be ethically
reviewed. Operational weaknesses such as the lack of a
registration system and long-term follow-up of the donors
are identified as the ‘Achilles heel of the model’.
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Living unrelated renal donation (LURD) is still a hot topic
in professional debates around organ shortage for trans-
plantation. The still increasing demand for renal transplan-
tation brings the subject of LURD to the core of medical
caregivers’ attention confronting them with a number of
controversial aspects of this entity topic, requiring ethical
consideration.
Transplantation societies and the World Health Organiza-
tion try to prevent unethical practices by formulating guide-
lines for the organ distribution and donation of unrelated living
kidneys. The declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking
and Transplant Tourism 2008 is among the latest common
global efforts to convince different countries to agree on a
common approach to stop commercial exploitation and
stimulation of deceased donation.1
Socioeconomic differences, as well as differences in cul-
tural values, religious beliefs, legislative barriers, and lack of
the required infrastructure between countries, may prevent
setting standard international guidelines. In this short review,
the positive and negative aspects of the Iranian LURD are
discussed.
HISTORY OF TRANSPLANTATION IN IRAN
Iran, located in southwest Asia (part of the Middle East),
covers an area of 1.65 million km2 and has nearly 75 million
inhabitants. It is characterized by a very young population.
One-fourth of the population is younger than 15 years with
a life expectancy at birth of 72 years. It is one of the largest
OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)
oil producers. The gross domestic product per capita was
estimated in US$4520 for 2009, but is subject to highly fluc-
tuating international oil prices. Unemployment was 10.5%
of total labor force and literacy rate in people older than
15 years was 85% (2008 estimates). Total health expenditure
share is 5.5% of gross domestic product. Under-five mortality
rate was 26 per 1000 live births (2010 estimate).2
The establishment of hemodialysis facilities goes back
more than 30 years.3,4 In 1974, Ministry of Health and
Medical Education (MOHME) established the first dialysis
center. Gradually, the number of patients on hemodialysis
increased from 587 patients in Tehran in 1991 to more than
25,000 (360 per million population, pmp) in 2006. Although
the first kidney transplantation took place in 1967, only 112
renal transplantations were performed until 1985. The
limited transplantation activity between 1979 and 1984 was
in part due to the circumstances of the 1979 revolution that
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caused Iranian assets to be frozen overseas and the Iran–Iraq
war. At the time, the MOHME allowed and funded patients to
receive transplantation abroad. Any dialysis patient who was
able to present the required documents and a potential living
related donor at a center overseas (mostly in the United
Kingdom) willing to operate the patient could apply for the
governmental funding.5,6
In 1985, aiming to solve the problem of long waiting list,
two renal transplantation centers were established and 274
renal transplantations were performed in the country within
the two following years. In 1988 a government regulated and
funded LURD program was set up and approved by the
Council of Guardians. Adopting a universal transplantation
program during the 8-year war was an outstanding achieve-
ment and blessing for patients with no access to dialysis and
for health authorities with limited budgets to set up new
dialysis centers and expanding or maintaining existing
ones.5,7,8 The ‘Gift of Altruism’/‘Rewarded Gifting’ govern-
mental scheme to any kidney donor was approved by the
Board of Ministers in early 1997.7,9 Dramatic increase in the
number of renal transplantation centers from 2 in 1985 to
13 in 199210 and 23 in 20014 resulted in almost disappearance
of waiting list in 1999.6–8
Shortly after the adoption of living unrelated transplanta-
tion program, the MOHME decided that transplant centers
were not allowed to perform transplantations using a kidney
from candidates with different citizenship than Iranian. The
suggestion for an amendment of the legislation came from
transplantation authorities to prevent wealthy patients from
neighboring countries or refugees (mainly Afghans) who
lived in the country from using the opportunities offered by
the Iranian model.4–7
The next major progress was the legislation of ‘Organ
Transplantation and Brain Death Act’ in 2000, legalizing
brain-dead organ donation.9 Until that year, a total of 7187
renal transplantations were performed from living unrelated
donors upon the implementation of LURD program.8
Introduction of laparoscopic donor nephrectomy in 2000
made transplantation cheaper and safer.11
Following the ‘Organ Transplantation and Brain Death
Act’ legislation, a virtual network was launched and it
gradually spread all over the country consisting of 13 organ
procurement units, all located in approved university hospitals
and 18 brain death identification units. The brain death
identification units in cities without transplantation centers
refer cases to actual transplantation centers. After performing
a number of medical tests, consultation with specialists and
an electroencephalogram, compatible with brain death, the
donor is transferred to an intensive care unit of the organ
procurement units.
The declaration of brain death is signed by five MOHME
appointed physicians (consisting of an internist, a neurolo-
gist, a neurosurgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a forensic
medicine specialist) after carrying out neurological tests and
a confirmatory electroencephalogram. According to the law,
the first-degree relatives of a brain-dead donor should be
informed about the situation and be offered the option of
donation. Written approval of first-degree relatives of potential
donor is necessary if consent for organ donation had not
been provided while the person was alive.4,12
MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE AND NATIONAL
FORMULARIES FOR IMMUNOSUPPRESSIVE DRUGS
All patients who need renal replacement therapy (RRT),
including renal transplantation, are classified as ‘patients
with special diseases’ and are provided governmental medical
insurance which reimburses dialysis and transplantation. Hence,
different modalities of RRT are free of charge and accessible for all
irrespective of age, sex, and financial situation in Iran (Figure 1).
Furthermore, the government imports and subsidizes essen-
tial immunosuppressive drugs and insurance agencies cover
the remaining cost of immunosuppressive drugs.3,4
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Figure 1 |Renal replacement therapy trend in iran between 2001 and 2010. HD, hemodialysis; PD, peritoneal; TX, transplantation.
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At first the immunosuppressive protocol consisted of
generic azathioprine, which was later replaced by mycophe-
nolate mofetil in 2000. A domestic pharmaceutical company
started producing mycophenolate mofetil under license of the
Roche Company in 2003 and later the generic form of
cyclosporine was added to its production list. Sirolimus is
prescribed from 2008 and also subsidized.9
THE PROCESS OF UNRELATED KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION
The caring physician explains the different treatment
modalities and priority of related donation to all patients
who need RRT (Figure 2). If a patient chooses or has to rely
on unrelated kidney transplantation, he/she will be referred
to the Iranian Patients’ Kidney Foundation. It was established
in 1978 and has currently 137 branches all over the country.
It is mainly run by volunteering patients who suffer from
chronic kidney diseases and is also called the Dialysis and
Transplant Patients Association. Any 18- to 35-year-old
person who wishes to donate a kidney is referred to the
foundation for registration, free of charge for both donors and
recipients.6,10
The primary evaluation, including routine medical labora-
tory tests and imaging, was assessed by physicians working in
the Patients’ Kidney Foundations’ clinics. The second step
consists in obtaining an informed consent from both donors
and their next of kin upon provision of a national identifi-
cation card to the foundation. Then the potential donor and
recipient are introduced to each other. For the final evalua-
tion, they are referred to a nephrologist who will check for
issues in detail. When the donor has some borderline laboratory
data, he will be barred from organ donation. It should
be mentioned that human leukocyte antigen typing is not
performed for LURDs, only a white blood cell cross-match is
routinely performed.5,6
Evaluation for subtle family pressure or coercion is parti-
cularly considered when the potential donors are female
(related/unrelated). They are informed by the nephrologist
that at any time the excuse of medical unsuitability can be
provided if they do not wish to donate.
According to the national kidney transplantation registry,
male to female donor ratio has been 1.6:1 in more than
21,000 related and unrelated kidney transplantation.4
The third step consists in a negotiation between the donor
and the recipient concerning an extra compensation for the
donor. It takes place at the foundation where a private space
is provided for them. The foundation does not keep records
of the agreed money for exchange and has no role in the
exchange process. Furthermore, the foundation maintains
some control on the issue by introducing another potential
donor to the recipient if a donor asks for an unusual amount
of money. The latter may also be omitted from the list of
potential donors. It should be pointed out that although the
amount of additional rewards from recipients to donors is
not regulated they are at least not subjected to abuse by brokers,
as recipients and donors meet face to face. After the operation,
the donor presents the documents of the transplantation to the
designated charity office called Charity Foundation for Special
Diseases (CFSD) to get the ‘gift of altruism’ and 1 year of
medical insurance. The money is allocated from governmental
funds but it is paid through CFSD.7,13 Transplantations are
performed in university hospitals and its expense is paid
by health insurance agencies and MOHME (Figure 2).7
Recently in a pilot study a fixed amount of money (approxi-
mately US$3500) was deposited with the Patients’ Kidney
Foundation as payment from the recipient before the transplant
was performed; it was paid to the donor after the procedure.
The results of this pilot study have not been officially reported
from the Iranian government.
PROGRAM SURVEILLANCE
Organ transplantation in Iran such as any other health
programs is under the supervision of the MOHME. Each
university of medical science has the responsibility to oversee
and regulate the management in the medical centers
belonging to their province, according to guidelines of
MOHME. One of the secretarial offices of the university of
medical sciences is engaged in coordinating different
modalities of RRT affairs. One of their tasks is to send a
complete list of the data and a detailed report of the expenses
related to deceased organ procurement of the transplant
centers, covered by the related university of medical science
in the province, to MOHME. Ten percent of the kidney
transplantation fee is covered by MOHME (90% by health
insurance companies). They also dispatch updated national
guidelines to affiliate centers and especially do surveillance on
distribution of immunosuppressive drugs.4,9
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Figure 2 | The process of living unrelated kidney donation and
transplantation. ESRD, end-stage renal disease; LRD, living
related donor; LURD, living unrelated renal donation; PKF, Patients
Kidney Foundation; TX, transplantation.
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MEDICAL CONCERNS IN LIVING UNRELATED DONATION
Short-term risk
The main short-term risk for the donors can arise mainly
from the surgery. An overall mortality risk of 0.02–0.03% has
been reported. The major and minor perioperative complica-
tions attained 1.5% and 8.5%, respectively, in Iran.14 Kasiske
investigated the risk of kidney donation through published
reports between 1970 and 1979,13 1980 and 1989,12 and after
19902; he found two deaths out of 3639 kidney donations
(0.05%), of which one donor was 76 years old at the time of
surgery. He also mentioned to the 0.03% risk of mortality
found in other surveys from UNOS-approved centers and the
different risk in different centers. It seems that the overall
mortality and major morbidity were not estimated to be
more than 0.03% and 0.23%, respectively.15 Segev et al.16 also
found surgical mortality of 3.1 per 10,000 live kidney
donation in the United States, which has not been changed
over the past 15 years. It seems the rates of short-term
complications in Iran are comparable to other international
studies. By the introduction of laparoscopic donor nephrec-
tomy, the procedure became more safe with lower morbid-
ities compared with open surgery. An important point is the
fact that all transplantation teams in Iran belong to university
hospitals licensed by MOHME, offering medical manage-
ment by well-trained hands used to functioning as a team.4,6
Long-term risks
Studies have repeatedly shown that the risk of developing
end-stage renal disease (ESRD) was 03–0.05%17,18 and that
survival of the donors who have been properly screened is
similar, if not superior, compared with the general popula-
tion.15–18
In the Ibrahim et al.17 study, 12.2±9.2 years after
donation the prevalence of hypertension and microalbumin-
uria were 32.1% and 12.7%, respectively. They have been
37.5% and 10.4%, respectively, in the only short-term medical
follow-up (17.2±5.0 months) in the Iranian donors.19 Lack
of long-term donor follow-up in Iranian model is one of the
major weak points of the system. In view of the major ethical
principle ‘do not harm’ and as health-care providers, we
should not only control the short-time risks but should also
take lifelong care of any possible comorbidity related to
donation of an organ. On two occasions in 2004, 500 donors
were called and invited to have health examinations in one of
the referral transplantation hospitals in Iran; just six patients
responded (personal communication with Dr Savaj).
ETHICAL CONCERNS IN LIVING UNRELATED DONATION
It is apparent that in the Iranian model several serious ethical
problems of unrelated kidney transplantation, as frequently
observed elsewhere in the world, have been suc-
cessfully managed: no brokers, no transplant tourism looking
for commercial organ transplantation, a law regulating the
same citizenship between recipient/donor, no financial
benefit for transplantation teams, and informed consent
not only from recipients but also their next of kin (Table 1).5,7,9
There are, however, still some serious concerns to be
addressed:
(1) Financial connection between donor and recipient
The main question, which has been a source of major
concern by international transplantation experts, is the direct
payment of the donor by the government and an additional
amount of money given by the recipient to the donor defined
in the literature as a vending relationship.
Payment in this model consists in two components: first is
monetary compensation for the life-saving act of donation
and second is the direct method of payment by the recipient.
Each has its own positive and negative points.
(A) Monetary compensation for donation: it is written in
the literature that once poor people are in the market to sell a
kidney, such sales will be coercive even in the context of informed
consent.20,21 (Although, nobody denies that the most important
motivation for donation in the Iranian model is not
emotional/altruistic, nor does anyone deny that most of the
donors belong to the low socioeconomic class.22) There are
Table 1 | Strategies of Iranian model to solve the dilemma of
sale vs. donation
Legal approval of compensation for donor and transplantation expense in
the hospital:
Saving lives of many ESRD patients especially before the Brain
Death Act
Waiting list omission
Complete medical and psychological examination of donors in the
hospital, in addition to routine outpatient evaluation process
No middle man/broker or travel to the country to buy kidneys
No financial benefit of transplantation team
Development of BDD program and its progression (increasing
experience of transplantation centers)
Same nationality of donor/recipient:
Donors cannot seek the highest possible price (no foreign patient can
enter the system)
Rich and poor can be transplanted
Supervision of Patients’ Foundation on donor motivation:
Getting informed written consent from donor and next of kin
No coercion of donors
No exploitation of the poor
Donor age 418
Separation of scientific responsibilities from ethical ones
Protection of fundamental doctor–patient relationship
Transplantation centers in academic hospitals licensed by the MOHME:
Decrease donor harm to the least
Development of newer and safer approaches possible
(e.g., laparoscopic nephrectomy)
Complete medical and psychological examination
Sharing with recipient in donor compensation:
Direct financial connection between donor/recipient (negative point)
Donors do not like to be known (negative point)
Transparency of system (no abuse in the system)
Development of BDD program and its progression (by redirection of
the budget)
Lack of protracted/long-term follow-up of donors
Abbreviations: BDD, brain death donation; ESRD, end-stage renal disease; MOHME,
Ministry of Health and Medical Education.
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two points, however, which deserve comment; autonomy,
and socioeconomic, situation of donors in comparison with
recipients.
(i)Autonomy: first of all, it’s very well documented that as
long as poverty exists, individual effort to change such a
condition will occur. Everybody has the right to overcome
his/her problems by socially acceptable approaches. In the
Iranian LURD model nobody interferes in the decision
making of the poor to take or not a relative higher risk that
the rich do not normally take. Preventing this act may mean
paternalism and only deprive them from the opportunity to
improve their socioeconomic situation.23,24 For example, the
ratio of those who belong to lower socioeconomic groups in
the US military service, particularly in the combat units, is
high and volunteering is encouraged by some national
rewarding system.25 Similarly, there is no objection to people
who choose to work as firefighters or in the mining business,
conditions well known to be at relative high risk for injury
as well as death. In our view, poverty cannot interfere with
individuals’ autonomy. As long as the donation is not
coercive, it is the responsibility of the community to respect
the dignity of the human (as is done for firefighters, soldiers,
and policemen who take high-risk jobs to protect others).24
In the Iranian model, there is no coercion from the recipient’s
or Patients’ Kidney Foundation’s side as the donor is referred
to the foundation by his/her own will. Obviously the
economic situation influences such decision.
In altruism-based systems, the bioethical principles
(autonomy, beneficence, justice, and nonmaleficence) look
balanced as the donor is satisfied by participating in changing
the life of the recipient by improvement of his/her health and
is highly appreciated in the social environment. Why should
the aspirations of the unrelated donor, who not only helps to
partly solve the problem of his/her own family (by monetary
compensation) but also to save the life of an ESRD patient by
taking a risk comparable to that of an unpaid donor, not be
duly appreciated?24
(ii) Socioeconomic situation of donors compared with
recipients: there are three different studies describing the donors’
socioeconomic status and the donors’ interaction with their
‘donation act’ (Table 2). Unemployment has been reported to
be 22.5,26 29%,22and 15%27. As expected, financial motiva-
tion was the main driving force for donation of an organ with
the money spent for medical purposes (the need for
hospitalization of a family member), to solve personal/family
problems, to pay back a debt, or for paid military service
Table 2 | Donor socioeconomic status in Iran
Heidary Rouchi26 (%) Malakoutian22 (%) Ghods5 (%) Zargooshi27 (%)
Sample size (person) 600 478 500 100
Location of research 17 Centers 30 Center 30 Centers One city
Time of filling questionnaire Before discharge X24mo of tx
Age (mean±s.d.) years 28.0±5.2 27±4.8 31±12
Gender: male/female 495/105=4.7 408/70=5.8 451/49=9.2 67/33=2
Related/nonrelated 32/568 0/478 0/500 0/100
Married 468 (79%) 82% (90)
Economic status Mean monthly income: US$
175.0±68.5 (43.5380.4)
o(2$/day): 297 (62%) Unable to afford average housing,
food, and college expense of their
children: 420 (84%)
Job
Unemployed 118 (22.5) 139 (29) (15)
Full-time 146 (27.9) (16)
Education
Illiterate (4.6) (2.7) (6) (29)
6–12 years (88.9) (90.8) (87.8) (71)
University degree (6.5) (6.5) (6.2) 0
Motivation
Purely financial 224 (37.3) (43)
Financial+altruistic 365 (60.8) — (57)
Purely altruistic 11 (1.9) (3)
Donor feeling
Complete/relative satisfaction 588 (98) 435 (91) (29)
Regret 9 (1.5) — (51)
Indifference 3 (0.5) (20)
Do they encourage it to others? 53%
Willing to be informed of transplant
outcome
457 (76.2%)
Willing to make connection with
recipient
400 (66.7%)
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exemption.26 The situation is in sharp contrast with socio-
economic status of the vendors in Pakistan as a typical
example of commercialism in transplantation, who in 90% of
the cases were illiterate (Iranian donors illiteracy rate is less
than 6% in most studies), live on less than US$1 a day (more
than 94%), and have no idea concerning the amount of
money they should receive.5,22,26,28
Nevertheless, most economic situations of the donor
and recipient are not that different from those described by
many renowned ethicists. Poverty has a broad definition. A
study on the economic situation of 500 recipients in Iran
defined 50.4% of the recipients as poor (those who could not
afford average housing, food, or college training for their
children). Those who were able to afford only average
housing, food, and college training of their children, defined
as the middle class, represented 36.2% of the transplanted
patients. Surprisingly, just 13.4% were classified as wealthy.5
In another study of 247 patients on hemodialysis in Tehran,
29.8% had to retire due to ESRD and another 26.9% were
unemployed, which emphasizes the fact that the economic
situation of the recipients is far from being clearly superior to
the average donor in the country.26 Charity organizations and
generous people not only actively support these patients’
renal transplantation expenses, but also help them in buying
some drugs not covered by insurance.5–7 In the suggested
model by Rizvi, participation of government and donations
covering the expense of the operation and immunosuppres-
sive drugs were the reasons for transplantation program
success in the Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplanta-
tion, which helped many poor patients to be trans-
planted.29,30
In another study on 2630 hemodialysis patients, only 7%
of those who were medically eligible for transplantation were
registered on a brain-dead donor waiting list in Tehran
province in 2005. This study emphasizes that even low-
income patients (as most patients on hemodialysis did not
have a job) took their time to evaluate the new offered modality
of brain death organs.26,31 Iranian potential recipients need
to be convinced by the successful outcome of the brain death
donation (BDD) program before they decide to register
eagerly for the brain-dead donor waiting list. If the law of
same citizenship had not been approved in the country,
wealthy candidates from high-income countries would have
been in the scene with appealing proposals for donors
(commercial organ transplantation) and the Iranian patients
would not have any choice to consider this option of
treatment. It is very well documented that the major financial
source of organ trafficking in most developing countries is
from recipients from developed countries who want to avoid,
by all means, the years long waiting time before being
transplanted.23,24
(B) Direct method of payment from recipient: it seems
that if governments or any other controlled health-related
organizations offer to pay all the costs, including a reasonable
compensation for the act of donation, not only the
questionable donor/recipient relationship will fade away but
also the donors’ feelings regarding their unequal benefit
(financial incentive) in comparison with the recipients (lives)
would be resolved.5,8 Such an approach could be applied in
high-income countries with the capabilities for practicing
other expensive ways to increase donation rates, including
desensitization protocols for ABO blood group–incompati-
ble/positive cross-match pairs, marginal donors, and organs
from cardiac-dead donors.
Owing to the inadequate budget (due to higher
percentage of its redirection to BDD program) allocated to
the LURD program by the Iranian government, the
involvement of the recipient in direct donor compensation
could not be prohibited. This donor compensation takes
place with transparency without manipulation of middle-
men, but at the expense of acquaintance between the donors
and recipients.
(2) Available sources of kidneys and the threat of postponing
or even terminating deceased or related organ donation
The transplantation program of Iran has been encouraging
transplantation from unrelated sources to overcome its
shortage in the early 1980s. Hemodialysis was not accessible
widely and brain death organ donation had not been
approved. It is important to know that law of Gift of
Altruism was approved in 1997 subsequent to the rejection
of Brain Death Organ Donation Act in the parliament in
1995. Overcoming the wide gap between organ demand
and supply by a realistic approach such as monetary
incentives facilitated 7187 renal transplantations from living
unrelated donors to be performed till the legislation of BDD
in 2000.8
After that it was time to revise the existing strategy. Health
professionals had to persuade the family members of potential
brain-dead individuals to donate organs. They also had to
inform the public and the dialysis population about the BDD
opportunity, despite the general belief that from cultural
(having an organ of a dead person in the body) and medical
points of view (longer ischemic time), it was not an optimal
source for kidney transplantation.
The budget for BDD program has been partly provided by
the redirection of budget from LURD program. In addition,
it is relevant to know that from 1990 to 2001, Iran had a
multi-exchange-rate system by which most essential supplies
were imported, averaging 1750 rials per US dollar. In March
2002, the multi-exchange-rate system was converted into a
rate of 7900 rials per US dollar. It means that as the govern-
mental financial incentive for kidney donation has not been
changed over years, its value decreased from more than
US$3500 in late 1990s to US$1265 in 2002 and to US$900
2011.
It may be argued that if the amount of official govern-
mental incentive had risen in parallel to the value of the
state’s currency, there would have been no need for the
participation of the recipient in the overall compensation and
even a non-directed (altruistic anonymous) LURD could be
have been promoted.
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In the brain-death organ procurement program,
65 000 000 rials (US$6119) is allocated to the organ
procurement unit for each brain-dead donor, and if two or
more organs are recovered from the BDD, this amount would
increase to $6453 and $9034. This amount does not include
what is paid to the transplantation centers for covering the
transplantation procedure expenses.
Obviously, the BDD program needs more elaborated
infrastructure as in most western countries. However, they do
not exist in many developing countries with their limited
number of specialists and centers. Training transplantation
teams was and still is a challenge, which mainly needed
teamwork at odd times of the day/night and even on holidays.
What helped Iranian transplant teams and patients in
managing the current transplantation program was their
experience with a high number of transplantations through
the Iranian model: many surgery, urology residents, and
nephrology fellows were trained in transplantation wards
during their education. As a result, management of
transplanted patients changed to a routine instead of a
complicated exceptional procedure. The immunosuppressive
drugs became accessible at reasonable prices and some of
them were even produced locally. Patients get used to this
sophisticated process, going along with repeated laboratory
tests and imaging procedures at regular intervals. Although
the results are encouraging, the program is still in its infancy
and there is a long way to carry on.
In Iran, the potential BDD is transferred to the intensive care
unit of organ procurement units, by the coordinating team.
This transfer is mandatory because the technical expertise and
human resources for managing the donor’s medical condi-
tion until harvesting are available only in university hospitals.
As Figure 3 shows, although the absolute number of
transplantations increased from 1421 in 2000 to 2285 in
2010, the 86% share of LURD in 2000 (20.1 pmp) decreased
to 75% in 2006 (23 pmp) and 69% in 2010 (21.8 pmp). This
change was mainly due to a substantial increase of BDD
(2.2% in 2000, 0.4 pmp to 26%, and 7.9 pmp in 2010).32 The
Iranian model is a clear answer to the many times formulated
criticism of a regulated LURD program prohibiting the
development of a deceased donor renal transplantation
program, even in developing countries.30
The problems with BDD seem to originate from infra-
structural deficiencies and cultural barriers (73% refusal rate
of BDD families) and are not due to the availability of the
paid kidney donation program.33 In contrast with the results
calculated by Harmon et al.,20 the success of the many
western countries’, and especially Spanish, BDD program
cannot be expected in the immediate future from many
developing countries including Iran. Their success is not just
due to passing the presumed consent law, but it is because the
hospitals are provided with specific budgets, qualified staff,
and sensitizing programs for the general population aiming
at better acceptance of BDD programs and not to the least
their years-long tradition and experience. We should not
forget that cultural obstacles are not easy to overcome. For
example, only 86 cases of organ donation from brain-dead
donors have been reported since the Organ Transplant law
passed in Japan, a fully-developed country, in 1997.34
(3) Some critics believe that poor donors are generally
underinformed and their so called informed consent
should be set aside
In the donation process, it is particularly difficult to distin-
guish decisions made under pressure from those made freely.
Informed consent is to satisfy the medical team that the
donor is able to make a rational decision on the basis of his/
her free will. Although we think that familial relationship
does not guarantee the altruistic donation, the informed
consent from the next of kin of donor in the Iranian model is
an attempt to make LURD the choice a consensus decision of
the family. Second, by the involvement of a not-for-profit
charity–based system in the process of getting the informed
consent, the role of a medical team responsible for the
medico-scientific approach and evaluation is separated from
the identification of the donors’ motivation and verification
of the informed consents. The physician’s authority to veto a
potential candidate for medical reasons is fully operative.
Future possible steps forward to improve the system are as
follows:
(1) Is it appropriate to ban the LURD at this step?
Some may believe that because of the promising way of
the BDD program, it is time to set aside the LURD. If we
consider the situation of limited available facilities of different
modalities of RRT, the increasing rate of ESRD incidence
globally and locally (prevalence and incidence rates of ESRD
in Iran increased from 238 pmp and 49.9 pmp in 2000 to 357
pmp and 63.8 pmp in 2006, respectively),3 and the current
approach of many countries in response to shortage of organs to
encourage live donation, such a decision would be unrealistic
and unreasonable. Furthermore, removal of any form of
pressure on members of the family by the patient or as a
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moral self-obligation by potential donors was and is one of
the advantages of Iranian model.
(2) It can be argued that we should focus as much as we
can on publicizing the BDD program and, little by little, it
may compete with LURD program. It may seem logical but
it should not be forgotten that the incidence of ESRD is
increasing worldwide and especially in developing countries.
Increasing the rate of BDD cannot keep pace with the
increasing number of ESRD patients.
(3) More support from the government for payment to
donors and elimination of the donor–recipient financial
relationship can solve some of the ethical concerns of the
model.
(4) It cannot be ignored that the LURD program had a
great impact in development of the necessary infrastructure
for a successful BDD program. However, the most essential
step to make the BDD program to materialize was the passage
of the law covering this program in the parliament. Ten years
of experience with scientific, social, and public educational
efforts made most people of the country familiar with the
issue and decreased refusal rate of BDD in families. It seems
that it is time for experts to work for the next step forward to
another national policy of presumed consents (assumed to
have given their consent to organ donation unless they
officially record their unwillingness during life) of all
residents of the country. By this law, coordinators can
approach mourning families easier and the family uncer-
tainty in decision making could be overcome. It may increase
the donation rate from BDD at least two times.
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